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CRIMINAL LAW-FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 41
AUTHORIZES ELECTRONIC INTRUSIONS IF PROBABLE CAUSE ESTAB-
LISHED; ALL WRITS ACT PROVIDES FOR AN ORDER TO A THIRD PARTY
COMPELLING AID IN CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDING IF THIRD
PARTY COULD OTHERWISE FRUSTRATE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
United States v. New York Telephone Co. (U.S. 1977)
In response to an affidavit submitted by agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) alleging that certain telephones were being used in
furtherance of illegal gambling activities, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York issued an order authorizing the FBI to
install pen registers 1 on the telephone lines and to use the devices "until
knowledge of the numbers dialed led to the identity of the associates and
confederates of those believed to be conducting the illegal operation." 2  As
part of the order, the court directed the New York Telephone Company
(Company) to furnish the government agents with "all information, facilities
and technical assistance" necessary to install the pen registers. 3 The Com-
pany agreed to provide information as to terminal locations but refused to
furnish the FBI with the telephone lines necessary to install the pen regis-
ters in an unobtrusive manner.4 Moving to vacate that part of the district
1. In United States v. Caplan, 255 F. Supp. 805 (E. D. Mich. 1966), the monitoring device
referred to as a pen register was described as a
device attached to a given telephone line usually at a central telephone office. A pulsation
of the dial on the line to which the pen register is attached records on a paper tape
dashes equal in number to the number dialed. The paper tape then becomes a permanent
and complete record of out going numbers called on the particular line. With reference to
incoming calls, the pen register records only a dash for each ring of the telephone but
does not identify the number from which the incoming call originated. The pen register
cuts off after the number is dialed on outgoing calls and after the ringing is concluded on
incoming calls without determining whether the call is completed or the receiver is
answered. There is neither recording nor monitoring of the conversation.
Id. at 807. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 549 n.1 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring
in part); Claerhout, The Pen Register, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 108 (1970).
Although the pen register devices have the capability of intercepting the contents of a
telephone conversation when coupled with wiretapping equipment, a court can limit or prohibit
the monitoring or recording of conversations by ordering that the pen register not be used in
conjunction with any other equipment. See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546
F.2d 243, 244 n.1 (8th Cir. 1976); In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 377 n.4 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 162 (1977). The district court deter-
mined that there was probable cause to believe that facilities of interstate commerce were being
used to further illegal gambling activities in violation of various provisions of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1952 (1976). United States v. New York
Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 162.
3. 434 U.S. at 161. The FBI was ordered to compensate the Company at the prevailing
rate for all assistance rendered. Id.
4. Id. at 162. The Company suggested that the FBI "string cables from the 'subject apart-
ment' to another location where pen registers could be installed." Id. at 163. The FBI con-
cluded, however, that any such installation would alert the suspect to the investigation. Id.
In refusing to lease the necessary lines to the FBI, the Company indicated that telephone
company regulations prohibited it from giving such assistance. Application of the United States
in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or Similar Mechanical Device,
538 F.2d 956, 957-58 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434
(623)
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court order, 5 the Company argued that only an order issued in compliance
with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Title 111)6
could require it to furnish these facilities and this tyle of assistance to the
FBI. 7 The district court denied the motion, holding that pen registers are
not subject to Title III's requirements, that the use of the devices must
comply with the strictures of the fourth amendment, and that the court
either possessed statutory authority under the All Writs Act (Act) 8 or had
inherent authority to compel the Company to assist the government agents
in the use of the pen registers. 9
On appeal, 10 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's determination that pen registers fall outside
the purview of Title 111,11 and held that the district court had the power to
authorize the use and installation of pen registers by virtue of its inherent
judicial authority or as a logical derivative of rule 41 of the Federal Rules of
U.S. 159 (1977). As one court has observed: "American Telephone & Telegraph has apparently
recommended to all Bell Telephone subsidiaries that company participation in a pen register
device installation is forbidden as a matter of company policy unless such installation [is] au-
thorized pursuant to 'the safeguards of the federal wiretap statutes."' Application of the United
States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398, 399 n.1
(W.D. Mo. 1976), quoting In re Joyce, 506 F.2d 373, 375 (5th Cir. 1975). But see notes 29-32
and accompanying text infra.
5. Application of United States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register or Similar Mechanical Device, 416 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976). Title III "prescribes the procedure for securing judicial
authority to intercept wire communications in the investigation of specified serious offenses."
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 507 (1974). For a detailed discussion of Title III, see
J. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (1977). For a discussion of the authorization
process under Title III, see Pulaski, Authorizing Wiretap Applications Under Title III: Another
Dissent to Giordano and Chavez, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 750 (1975). For the legislative history of
Title III, see! note 25 infra.
7. Application of United States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register or Similar Mechanical Device, 416 F. Supp. 800, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). The All Writs Act provides: "The Supreme Court and all
courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." Id. Once it has been
established that a court has jurisdiction over a matter, the Act enables the court, in its discre-
tion, to issue all writs necessary to preserve and protect its authority. See Application of the
United States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or Similar
Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956, 961 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub non. United
States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977). For a discussion of the All Writs Act, see
notes 43-47 and accompanying text infra. For cases in which the All Writs Act was applied, see,
e.g., Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66, 69 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Field, 193 F.2d
92, 96 (2d Cir. 1951); United States v. McHie, 196 F. Supp. 586, 588 (N.D. II1. 1912). See also
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 608-12 (1966); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282-84
(1948); Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1942).
9. Application of United States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register or Similar Mechanical Device, 416 F. Supp. 800, 801-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
10. The original order had been extended for an additional 20 (lays. United States v. New
York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 163 n.3 (1977).
11. Application of the United States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen
Register or Similar Mechanical Device, 538 F.2d 956, 958-59 (2d Cir. 1976). The court further
concluded that pen registers were not regulated or prohibited by any other federal statute. Id.
at 959.
[ OL. 24: p. 623
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Criminal Procedure (rule 41). 12 The court of appeals, however, reversed
that portion of the district court's holding which required the Company to
render assistance to the FBI.'" The Second Circuit assumed, arguendo,
"that a district court has inherent discretionary authority or discretionary
power under the All Writs Act to compel technical assistance by the Tele-
phone Company" 14 but concluded that the court had abused its discretion in
this particular case in ordering the Company to aid the government.15
On writ of certiorari, the United States Supreme Court agreed that
Title III does not govern the use of pen registers and that rule 41 authorizes
electronic intrusions upon a finding of probable cause. 6 The Court re-
versed the decision of the Second Circuit, however, holding that pursuant to
the All Writs Act, a district court may compel the assistance of a third party
who is in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or the
proper administration of justice. 1 7  United States v. New York Telephone
Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
12. Id. at 959-60, citing FED. R. CIM. P. 41. For the text of rule 41, see note 37 infra. The
court also noted that "a pen register order involves a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, and .. .a court may issue such an order only upon a showing of probable cause."
538 F.2d at 959.
13. 538 F.2d at 960-63.
14. Id. at 961. For a discussion of the All Writs Act, see note 8 supra.
15. 538 F.2d at 961. The Second Circuit concluded that the All Writs Act could provide the
basis for a district court's authority to compel technical assistance by the telephone com-
pany, but noted that such an order was not always proper. Id. The court pointed out that
the Act "is entirely permissible in nature" and "is addressed to the discretionary power of the
court." Id. Consequently, the Second Circuit propounded a balancing test under which the trial
court would weigh the factors militating towards the issuance of such an order against the
danger of establishing a precedent whereby federal courts could compel unwilling third parties
to assist in criminal law enforcement activities. Id. The favorable factors examined by the Sec-
ond Circuit were: 1) that FBI agents could not effectively install the pen registers without the
assistance of the Company; 2) that the Company would only be required to expend minimal
time and effort in helping with the installation of the devices; 3) that fear of civil or criminal
liability by the Company was groundless; 4) that the Company would be compensated for its
services; and 5) that law enforcement would be thwarted absent the issuance of such an order.
Id. at 961-62.
Although a balancing test was espoused, the court seemed to indicate that the issuance of
an order compelling assistance by a third party would be an abuse of discretion in all cases. Id.
at 961-63. The court stated that "in the absence of specific and properly limited Congressional
action, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order the Telephone Company to
furnish technical assistance." Id. at 961. The majority was concerned that "such an order could
establish a most undesirable, if not dangerous and unwise, precedent for the authority of federal
courts to impress unwilling aid on private third parties." Id. at 962. The court stated that if "the
Government requires technical assistance, it is far better to have the authority for ordering that
assistance clearly defined by statute rather than deriving the authority from the very general All
Writs Act." Id. at 962-63.
In a vigorous dissenting opinion, Judge Mansfield rejected the majority's abuse of discre-
tion theory. Id. at 963 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield argued that the district
courts were in the best position to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a compelling
need for an ancillary order existed, and the dissent therefore concluded that the legislative
action called for by the majority was inappropriate. Id. at 965 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
16. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 165-70 (1977).
17. Id. at 172-74. Since the original order authorizing the use of the pen registers had been
extended, see note 10 supra, the FBI had completed its surveillance by the time the circuit
1978-1979]
3
Gussack: Criminal Law - Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 Authorizes E
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1979
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
In 1934, Congress enacted section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act (section 605),18 which prohibited anyone not authorized by the sender of
"wire or radio" communications from intercepting or divulging the contents
of those communications or the facts of their transmission.1 9 This statutory
restriction on the use of electronic surveillance techniques in criminal inves-
tigations was applied in Nardone v. United States,2 0 where the Supreme
Court determined that section 605 prohibited the use of wiretap evidence in
criminal prosecutions z. 2  Moreover, section 605 had been construed as pro-
scribing the admissibility of direct wiretap evidence and evidence derived
from information obtained during the unlawful interception.2 2 In maintain-
ing this broad interpretation of section 605, the use of pen registers had
repeatedly been considered a violation of this provision. 23 The development
of the law in this area, however, was frequently criticized for its inconsis-
tency and nonuniform application.2 4
court issued its decision. 434 U.S. 159, 165 n.6. However, the Supreme Court determined that
the case was not rendered moot "because the controversy here is one 'capable of repetition, yet
evading review."' Id., quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Southern Pac. Terminal Co.
v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
18. As originally enacted, § 605 provided in pertinent part:
[N]o person receiving, assisting in receiving, transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the exis-
tence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning thereof, except through authorized
channels of transmission or reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his
agent or attorney, (2) to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication
to its destination, . . . or (6) on demand of other lawful authority. No person not being
authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the
existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communi-
cation to any person ....
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended by Act of June 19, 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)).
19. Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103, as amended by Act of June 19, 1968,
tit. III, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). For a general discussion
of the historical development of electronic surveillance, see 8A J. MOORE, RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 41.08-.08[4] (2d ed. 1977); C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 665 (1969).
20. 302 U.S. 379 (1937). The Court focused on the second sentence of § 605, which prohib-
ited the interception and divulgence of communications by anyone not authorized by the
sender. Id. at 382-83. For the text of the original version of § 605, see note 18 supra.
21. 302 U.S. at 384. In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that since federal law
enforcement officials were not specifically mentioned in § 605, they were not subject to the
prohibitions of that provision. Id. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 19 § 665, at 45 n.97.
22. See, e.g., Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321, 329, 331 (1939) (holding also that § 605 was applicable to intrastate as well as
interstate communications).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Caplan,
255 F. Supp. 805 (E.D. Mich. 1966); United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. I11.
1965), aff'd, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966). In Dote, the Seventh Circuit determined that the
electronic impulses emitted while a telephone number was being dialed were "wire communica-
tions" within the meaning of § 605. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d at 180. Consequently, the
interception of these signals with a pen register was considered a violation of the statute. Id.
24. See PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 201-03 (1967).
[VOL. 24: p. 623
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In 1968, Congress responded to this dissatisfaction by enacting Title
111,25 which liberalized the use of wiretapping by law enforcement agents 28
and amended section 605.27 Title III is a comprehensive wiretap statute in
which "Congress authorized wire interceptions for the investigation of
specific crimes as long as the safeguards of minimization and supervision by
the court were evinced." 28 Most federal courts agree that pen registers are
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1968, tit. III, § 802,
82 Stat. 187, as amended by Act of July 29, 1970, tit. II, § 211(b), (c), 84 Stat. 654 (amending
§§ 2511, 2518, 2520); Act of Oct. 15, 1970, tit. II, § 227(a), tit. VIII, § 810, tit. IX, § 902(a), tit.
XI, § 1103, 84 Stat. 930 (repealing § 2514; amending §§ 2516, 2517; Act of Jan. 2, 1971, tit. IV,
§ 16, 85 Stat. 1891 (amending § 2516)). Title III provides in pertinent part:
§ 2510. DEFINITIONS.
As used in this chapter -
(1) "wire communication" means any communication made in whole or part through
the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or
other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or
operated by any person engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such
facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign communications;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibit-
ing an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under cir-
cumstances justifying such expectation;
(5) "electronic, mechanical, or other device" means any device or apparatus which
can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than-
(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any compo-
nent thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common carrier
in the ordinary course of its business; or (ii) being used by a communications common
carrier in the ordinary course of its business, or by an investigative or law enforcement
officer in the ordinary course of his duties.
§ 2518. PROCEDURE FOR INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS.
(4) . .. An order authorizing the interception of a wire or oral communication shall,
upon request of the applicant, direct that a communication common carrier . . . shall
furnish the applicant forthwith all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary
to accomplish the interception unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with
the services that such carrier . . . is according the person whose communications are to
be intercepted.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(1), (2), (5)(a), 2518(4) (1976).
26. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 19, § 665, at 55 n.43.
27. See Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 803, 82 Stat. 223 (amending 47
U.S.C. § 605 (1970)). Section 605 was amended in two major respects. The introductory clause
"except as authorized by chapter 119, Title 18" was added, and "radio" was inserted in the
second sentence before the word "communication." See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970). In Korman v.
United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973), the court noted that its prior interpretation of
§ 605 as prohibiting the use of pen registers was no longer controlling because the language of
§ 605 had been changed to "any radio communication." Id. at 931-32 n.ll (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of § 605 prior to the amendment of that
provision, see note 23 supra. It is now generally recognized that the use of pen registers is not
proscribed by § 605. See, e.g., Hodge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 555 F.2d 254,
258-61 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974). But see Note,
The Legal Constraints Upon the Use of the Pen Register as a Law Enforcement Tool, 60 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1028, 1030-42 (1975).
28. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 250 (8th Cir. 1976). Criteria
for lawful interceptions under Title III include: 1) the limitation that the interception be in
5
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not subject to the strictures of Title 111,29 the statute's provisions apply only
to surveillance involving an "interception," which is defined as the "aural
acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communications." 30 Since
the pen register by itself is incapable of aural acquisition, 31 the courts have
concluded that the use of the device falls outside the scope of Title 111.32
In the absence of federal legislation squarely addressing the issue, the
source of judicial power to authorize the use of pen registers and to impose
limitations on their use has had to be determined by the courts. 33  Some
courts have adhered to the notion that the pen register's use must comply
with the constitutional requirements of the fourth amendment for search
warrants, 34 and one district court has held that some "specific statutory au-
respect to specified crimes; 2) the requirement of judicial approval of the wiretap request; 3) the
judge's finding that normal investigative techniques are inadequate; and 4) stringent compliance
with other pre-interception and post-interception procedural safeguards. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516,
2518(1)-(8) (1976). See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514-15 (1974); Gelbard v.
United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972); J. MooRE, supra note 19, 41.08[4] at 41-125; C.
WRICHT, supra note 19, § 665, at 56-59.
29. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 388 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 811-12 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 610 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Falcone, 505 F.2d 478, 482 (3d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); United States v. Finn, 502 F.2d 938, 942 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Brick, 502 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1974); Korman v. United States, 486
F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. King, 335 F. Supp. 523, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1971),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 920 (1974).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(4) (1976). "'[Ilntercept' means the aural acquisition of the contents of
any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device."
Id.
31. For an explanation of how the pen register may be used to intercept the contents of a
communication, see note 1 supra.
32. See cases cited note 29 supra. Accord, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Giordano, Justice Powell stated:
"The installation of a pen register device to monitor and record the numbers dialed from a
particular telephone line is not governed by Title III." Id. Justice Powell was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist in this opinion.
This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative history of Title III. See S. REP. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2112, 2178. The
legislative history explains the intentional exclusion of the device from Title III's regualtion:
The proposed legislation is not designed to prevent the tracing of phone calls. The use of
the "pen register" for example would be permissible. But see United States v. Dote, 371
F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966). The proposed legislation is intended to protect the privacy of
the communication itself and not the means of communication.
Id. For a discussion of the meaning of the "But see Dote" language in the senate report, see
Note, supra note 27 at 1035; 1977 DUKE L.J. 751, 752 n.ll; see also notes 23 & 27 supra.
Nevertheless, courts have held that pen registers used in conjunction with wiretaps are
subject to the requirements of Title III. See, e.g., Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926,
931-32 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Focarile, 340 F. Supp. 1033, 1039-40 (D. Md.), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Giordano, 469 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1972), aff'd, United States v.
Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
33. The Supreme Court has decided to review the decision of the Maryland Supreme Court
in Smith v. Maryland, 283 Md. 1,5, 389 A.2d 858, cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 609 (1978), to
determine whether the use of a pen register constitutes a search within the meaning of the
fourth amendment. 99 S. Ct. at 609.
34. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 553-54 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). See United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546
F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1975), wherein the court stated that "the propriety of a pen register's
[VOL. 24: p. 623
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1979], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss3/10
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
thority or rule" is a necessary prerequisite to such a court order. 35  The
majority of circuits, however, have determined that either the court's inhe-
rent judicial power 36 or rule 41, which regulates the search and seizure of "
property by federal law enforcement officials, 37 provides the requisite au-
thority. 
38
Related to the question of the source of the court's power to issue a pen
register authorization is the problem of whether a court may compel a third
usage depends entirely upon compliance with the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citation omitted).
See also United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir. 1976). The
fourth amendment allows for warrants to issue with respect to intangible as well as tangible
items that are proper subjects of a search. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354-56 (1967)
(fourth amendment applies to intangible information seized by electronic surveillance); Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1967) (seizure of evidence by electronic surviellance).
35. Application of United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register Device,
407 F. Supp. 398, 403 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
36. See, e.g., United States v. John, 508 F.2d 1134, 1141 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
962 (1975); United States v. Best, 363 F. Supp. 11, 17-18 (S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v.
Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. Fla. 1970). These courts, in relying upon their inherent
judicial authority to order the use of the pen register, have stressed the fact that there was
probable cause for the use of the device. See also United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d 243, 245 (8th Cir. 1976) (court's power to order electronic surveillance is equivalent to
power to order a search warrant and is inherent in district court).
37. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(a) A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by .. .a federal magis-
trate ... within the district wherein the property sought is located, upon request of a
federal law enforcement officer ....
(b) A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property
that constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense, or (2) contraband, the
fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed, or (3) property designed or in-
tended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal
offense.
(c) If the federal magistrate ... is satisfied that grounds for the application exist or
that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue a warrant identifying
the property and naming or describing the person or place to be searched.
(h) The term "'property" is used in this rule to include documents, books, papers and
any other tangible objects.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 41.
38. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977)
(orders issued pursuant to rule 41); United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 813
(7th Cir. 1976) (district courts have power under rule 41 to authorize use of pen register).
Due to recent technological advances, rule 41 has been interpreted as applying to the
search and seizure of intangible evidence as well as tangible property. See id. Although the
courts concede that electronic impulses recorded by pen registers are not "property" in the
strict sense of that term as it is 'Used in rule 41(b), FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b), it is urged that the
rule nevertheless authorizes an order directing a "seizure" of intangible evidence. See Michigan
Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977). But cf. Application of United
States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Mo.
1976). In this case, the Government argued that the Supreme Court's opinions dealing with
electronic surveillance indicate that "the technical requirements of Rule 41 would not be
applied to prohibit a sophisticated investigative technique merely because Rule 41 was drafted
in terms of physical, rather than electronic, evidence." Id. at 399, citing Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385
U.S. 323 (1966). The court concluded, however, that an order authorizing the use of pen regis-
ters had to be based on some legal authority other than rule 41. 407 F. Supp. at 404. Accord,
United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976).
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party to assist the government in implementing the order. Those courts
which have concluded that pen registers are not subject to the requirements
of Title III would necessarily find that the provisions of that statute which
authorize corollary orders to compel the assistance of third parties are also
inapplicable. 39  Many courts, however, have held that the scope of authority
granted under the All Writs Act, 40 or the inherent judicial power of the
court, 41 is determinative of this issue.4 2
The All Writs Act empowers a federal court to enter those orders it
deems necessary to preserve and protect its jurisdiction. 43 The Act does not
enlarge the court's jurisdiction, but rather serves to effectuate the estab-
lished jurisdiction of the court.4 4  This power has traditionally been used to
enforce prior orders of the court that are threatened by noncompliance or by
obstruction by third parties.4 5
39. Under Title III, third parties may be compelled to assist in the installation of a wiretap.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (1976). For the text of this provision, see note 25 supra.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). For the text of this provision, see note 8 supra.
41. The inherent power theory stems from United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d
809 (7th Cir. 1976), where the court interpreted § 2518 of Title III, 28 U.S.C. § 2518 (1976), as
"strong and persuasive authority, by analogy, for the proposition that district courts in the area
of electronic surveillance, inherently have power to effectively compel compliance with validly
issued orders." 531 F.2d at 814. In Application of the United States for Relief, 427 F.2d 639
(9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth Circuit had concluded that the district court lacked statutory and
inherent authority to compel the aid of the telephone company in the installation of a wiretap.
Id. at 644. Seventy-two days later, Congress amended § 2518(4) to authorize a district court to
compel a communication carrier to furnish all necessary technical assistance. For the text of
§ 2518(4), see note 25 supra. It has been argued that this action indicated congressional accep-
tance of the views expressed by the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
546 F.2d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1976) (Lay, J., dissenting).
A generally accepted view, however, is that Congress originally presumed that the district
courts had the power to compel compliance with orders authorizing electronic surveillance.
Congress thus was legislating in an area where it had presumed the court's inherent power was
sufficient. See United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 813-14 (7th Cir. 1976).
Accord, United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243, 246 (8th Cir. 1976). For a
critique of this analysis, see Comment, Judicial Coercion of Unwilling Telephone Companies in
Pen Register Cases, 45 U. CIN. L. REV. 649, 653-54 (1976).
42. See, e.g., Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385, 389 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976). Contra, Application of
the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register Device, 407 F. Supp.
398, 405 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (the All Writs Act does not vest the court with independent jurisdic-
tional power to authorize use of a pen register).
43. See United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1976). In Illinois Bell,
the court noted that the All Writs Act does not expand a court's authority, but rather "confers
ancillary jurisdiction where jurisdiction is otherwise granted and lodged in the court." Id. at 814
n.
8
, citing United States v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 248 F.2d 804, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958). For a general discussion of the All Writs Act, see 9 J.
MOORE, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 110.26 (2d ed. 1977); Bell, The Federal Appellate
Courts and the All Writs Act, 23 Sw. L.J. 858 (1969); note 8 supra.
44. 9 J. MOORE, supra note 43, 110.26, at 282. See cases cited note 8 supra.
45. See, e.g., Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797, 805 (8th Cir. 1958) (preliminary in-
junction issued against state officials prohibiting their use of National Guard to frustrate court
approved school integration plan); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F.
Supp. 1, 6 (E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 579 (1968) (use of All Writs Act to enjoin persons
from thwarting compliance with original order to which not parties).
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Once the district court establishes an independent basis under rule 41
for the use of pen registers, it may conclude that the order compelling the
cooperation of the third party is necessary to effectuate the underlying order
and is authorized by the All Writs Act. 46 A number of circuits have thus
relied on the Act as authority for the issuance of remedial orders, stating
that the Act provides support "for the proposition that the telephone com-
pany cannot frustrate the exercise of the district court's order by refusing to
make available its facilities." 4 7
It was against this historical background that the Supreme Court began
its analysis of whether a district court may direct a telephone company to
provide necessary assistance to law enforcement officials in their use of pen
registers.4 8 The Court initially determined that the use of pen registers was
not governed by Title III since the devices "do not acquire the 'contents' of
communications" as required by that statute.4 9
The Court further determined that federal courts were granted the au-
thority to direct the installation of pen registers under rule 41.50 Examining
the language of the rule, the Court observed that it was sufficiently broad to
encompass an electronic "search" intended to discover the suspected crimi-
nal use of a telephone and the "seizure" of evidence the "search" might
reveal. 51 The Court explained that rule 41 should be interpreted flexibly
"to include within its scope electronic intrustions authorized upon a finding
of probable cause" 52 because a contrary holding would create the anomalous
result of permitting the interception of conversations by wiretapping under
Title III while prohibiting the limited intrusions resulting from the use of
pen registers. 53
46. United States v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 531 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir. 1976).
47. Id. Accord, Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d 385 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1976). These courts have
recognized that the failure to direct the telephone company to provide expert assistance in the
installation of the devices would effectively operate to nullify the original order. Michigan Bell
Tel. Co. v. United States, 565 F.2d at 389; United States v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546
F.2d at 246-47.
In Michigan Bell, the court emphasized the fact that the telephone company was not an
ordinary third party, but rather was a "public utility, enjoying a monopoly in an essential area of
communications." 565 F.2d at 389. The court thus determined that the company was in an
especially important position to assist in the detection and prevention of crime. Id.
48. United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 (1977).
49. Id. at 166-67. The Court noted that its conclusion was supported by the legislative
history of Title III. Id. at 167-68. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
50. 434 U.S. at 168-69. For the text of rule 41, see note 37 supra.
51. 434 U.S. at 169.
52. Id. at 169 (citations omitted). The Court recognized that the definition of property in
rule 41(h), FED. R. CiuM. P. 41(h), refers to "tangible" objects, but concluded that this was not
intended to be an exclusive definition. 434 U.S. at 169. For the text of rule 41(h), see note 37
supra. Rather, the Court stated: "Where the definition of a term in Rule 41(h) was intended to
be all inclusive, it is introduced by the phrase 'to mean' rather than 'to include."' 434 U.S. at
169 n.15 (citation omitted).
53. 434 U.S. at 170 & n.18. According to the Court, such an "anomalous result" would be
contrary to the congressional judgment "that the use of pen registers 'be permissible."' Id. at
170, quoting S. REP. NO. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 90, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONC.
& AD. NEws. 2112, 2178. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra. The Court buttressed
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In discussing the propriety of that part of the order which compelled
the Company to assist in the installation and operation of the devices, the
Court acknowledged the circuit court's concern 54 that such a directive con-
stitutes a significant infringement on a third party's individual rights. 55 Rec-
ognizing that a court cannot impose unreasonable burdens on the third
party, 56 the Court nonetheless concluded that pursuant to the All Writs Act,
a trial court can issue an order necessary "to effectuate and prevent the
frustration of orders it has previously issued." 5 7  The Act, the Court indi-
cated, is applicable not only to the original parties, but also to those who,
although not original parties, are in a position to obstruct the implementa-
tion of a court order.5 8
Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, the Court
reasoned that since the Company's property was suspected of being used in
criminal activities, the Company was sufficiently involved in the underlying
controversy to be subject to an assistance order. 59  Evaluating the burden of
compliance with the district court's order, the Court determined that the
Company would not be undu!y burdened. 60 In addition, it was determined
that the Company's assistance was absolutely necessary to accomplish the
covert installation of the pen register device. 6 1 The Court thus upheld the
its argument by referring to rule 57(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, FED. R.
CRIM. P. 57(b), which provides: "If no procedure is specifically prescribed by rule, the court
may proceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable
statute." 434 U.S. at 170, quoting FED. R. CBJM. P. 57(b) (footnote omitted).
54. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra.
55. 434 U.S. at 171. The Court interpreted the circuit court's holding as "generally barring
district courts from ordering any party to assist in the installation or operation of a pen regis-
ter." Id. For a discussion of the Second Circuit's analysis in New York Telephone, see notes
10-15 and accompanying text supra.
56. 434 U.S. at 172. The Court stated: "We agree that the power of federal courts to impose
duties upon third parties is not without limits; unreasonable burdens may not be imposed." Id.
57. Id. The Court reviewed cases in which § 262 of the Judicial Code, Pub. L. No. 61-475,
ch. 11, § 262, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911), the predecessor to the All Writs Act, had been liberally
construed in order to aid the courts in the performance of their duties. 434 U.S. at 172-73,
citing Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 282 (1948) (habeas corpus order issued requiring a
prisoner to argue his own appeal before federal court of appeals); Adams v. United States, 317
U.S. 269, 273 (1942) (federal court has power to issue writ of habeas corpus incident to appeal
pending before the court).
58. 434 U.S. at 174, citing Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir, 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 1
(E.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 579 (1968). See notes 39-47 and accompanying text supra.
59. 434 U.S. at 174. The Court stated: "[W]e do not think that the Company was a third
party so far removed from the underlying controversy that its assistance could not be permis-
sibly compelled." Id.
60. Id. at 174-75. The Court noted that the Company would be compensated for the use of
its facilities and for any technical assistance provided, that the order required minimal effort on
the part of its employees, and that the Company, as a highly regulated public utility, had a duty
to serve the public. Id.
61. Id. at 175. See note 4 and accompanying text supra. While noting that citizens have
often been requested to provide assistance to law enforcement officials, the Court stated: "[W]e
do not address the question of whether and to what extent such a general duty may be legally
enforced in the diverse contexts in which it may arise." 434 U.S. at 175-76 n.24.
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district court's order compelling the Company to furnish facilities and tech-
nical assistance to the FBI in connection with the use of the pen regis-
ters.
62
In a dissenting opinion, 63 Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's
"patchwork interpretation" of rule 41 and the broad construction given the
All Writs Act. 64  The dissent stated that rule 41 is not a "general authoriza-
tion for district courts to issue any warrants not otherwise prohibited," but
rather operates as a limitation on the circumstances under which a warrant
may be obtained and the kind of property that may be seized. 65
Focusing on the definition of "property" contained in the rule, 66 and on
other operative provisions, 67 Justice Stevens concluded that the warrants
authorized by rule 41 are limited to searches for tangible property. 68  Con-
tinuing, the dissent reasoned that Congress, after it had carefully drafted a
comprehensive statute regulating the use of wiretaps, did not intend to au-
thorize the issuance of warrants for electronic seizure of intangible evidence
without providing clear statutory safeguards. 69 Consequently, the dissent
62. 434 U.S. at 174-78.
63. Id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). justices Brennan and Marshall joined in
Justice Stevens' dissent. Justice Stewart concurred in the majority opinion in so far as it deter-
mined that pen registers were not subject to Title III and that a district court had the authority
to issue an order regarding their use. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stewart, however, agreed with the dissenters that the district court could not compel
the Company to assist the government in the installation of the device. Id.
64. Id. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The dissent agreed with the majority's con-
clusion that Title III does not govern the use of pen registers. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part). For a discussion of the majority's position on this issue, see note 49 and accompanying
text supra.
65. 434 U.S. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens supported his conclu-
sion by referring to the enactment of Title IX of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 (Title IX), 18 U.S.C. § 3103(a) (1976), which authorized the issuance of a warrant for
property that constitutes "mere evidence" of criminal activity as distinguished from fruits or
instrumentalities of a crime. 434 U.S. at 182-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Prior to the
enactment of Title IX, "mere evidence" could not be the subject of a valid seizure. Id. at 183.
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part). According to Justice Stevens, in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967), the Supreme Court discarded the "mere evidence" rule, and Title IX was enacted in
response to the inconsistency that existed between the Hayden holding-which removed the
constitutional bar to the search and seizure of mere evidence-and rule 41-which did not
authorize the issuance of a warrant for mere evidence. 434 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., dissenting
in part).
The dissent argued that if rule 41 were intended as a general authorization for warrants not
otherwise prohibited by the fourth amendment, there would have been no need to enact Title
IX to encompass "mere evidence." Id. at 184 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
66. 434 U.S. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(h). For
the text of this provision, see note 37 supra.
67. 434 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), citing FED. R. CiM. P. 41(c), (d), (e).
Justice Stevens reasoned that those provisions which concern the issuance of a warrant, the
preparation of an inventory of property seized pursuant to a search warrant and defendant's
motion requesting the return of seized property, would be "almost meaningless if read as relat-
ing to electronic surveillance of any kind." 434 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
68. 434 U.S. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). justice Stevens noted that each item
listed in the definition of property in rule 41(h) was "tangible," and that the final reference to
.'any other tangible items" must have defined the "outer limits of the included category." Id. at
184 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted), quoting FED. R. CaiM. P. 41(h).
69. 434 U.S. at 184-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
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concluded that the district court lacked the power to issue the order au-
thorizing the use of the pen registers by the FBI. 70  Since the initial order
was "a nullity," the dissent maintained that "[i]t cannot, therefore, support
the further order requiring the ...Company to aid in the installation of the
device." 71
Assuming, arguendo, that the pen register authorization was valid, Jus-
tice Stevens nevertheless concluded that the All Writs Act did not empower
the district court to issue the order directing the Company to assist in the
installation of the devices. 72  The dissent noted that the Act limited the
court's action to that "in aid of its duties and its jurisdiction." 73 Recogniz-
ing that the majority supported its position that the issuance of the order
was necessary or appropriate to aid the district court's jurisdiction, Justice
Stevens concluded that the directive merely facilitated the performance of
the FBI's investigatory functions. 74  According to the dissent, the majority's
construction of the Act provided "a sweeping grant of authority entirely
without precedent in our Nation's history."75
As the dissent indicated, the Court's determination that rule 41 au-
thorizes the issuance of pen register orders is subject to criticism.76 By
70. Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated: "[Tihe focus of inquiry
should .. . [be] whether Congress has expressly authorized .. . [the intrusion], and no such
authorization can be drawn from Rule 41." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The dissent
continued:
[Tihere is nothing anomalous about concluding that it is a forbidden activity until Con-
gress has prescribed the safeguards that should accompany any warrant to engage in it.
Even if an anomaly does exist, it should be cured by Congress rather than by a loose
interpretation of "property" under Rule 41 which may tolerate sophisticated electronic
surveillance techniques never considered by Congress and presenting far greater dangers
of intrusion than pen registers.
Id. at 185 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
72. Id. at 186-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The dissent stated it is an "undisputed fact
that the All Writs Act does not provide federal courts with an independent grant of jurisdic-
tion." Id. at 188 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part), citing Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U.S. 450
(1887); Mclntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813).
73. 434 U.S. at 189 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis supplied by the dissent)
(footnote omitted). Moreover, while recognizing that "the court's power to issue an order re-
quiring a party to carry out the terms of the original judgment is well settled," the dissent
noted that even this power is subject to certain restraints. Id. at 188 (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 188-89 & nn.19 & 20 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). "The fact that a party may
be better able to effectuate its rights or duties if a writ is issued never has been, and under the
language of the .. . [Act] cannot be, a sufficient basis for issuance of the writ." Id. at 189
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens emphasized that while writs
issued in aid of a court's jurisdiction will usually benefit one of the parties to the original order,
the converse is not always true. Id. n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). The dissent continued:
"Concededly, citizen cooperation is always a desired element in any government investigation,
and lack of cooperation may thwart such an investigation, even though it is legitimate and
judicially sanctioned .... [But] [p]lainly the District Court's jurisdiction does not ride on the
Government's shoulders until successful completion of an electronic surveillance." Id. at 190
(Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
76. For a discussion of the dissent's analysis with respect to this issue, see notes 63-70 and
accompanying text supra.
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construing rule 41(h)77 as being merely an illustration of the kinds of prop-
erty covered by the rule, rather than a comprehensive enumeration of the
items included, 78 the majority ignored the clear wording of the rule, which
refers to searches for "tangible" objects. 79
Furthermore, in light of the comprehensive statutory scheme for the
regulation of wiretaps provided in Title 111,80 it is suggested that the use of
any investigative electronic surveillance device not included therein 8l
should be expressly regulated by Congress. It is submitted the Court should
not presume that authority to issue pen register orders exists in rule 41
absent a clear congressional expression of intent similar to that expressed in
Title III.
Additionally, the Court's determination that the All Writs Act was
applicable in New York Telephone is subject to criticism. The Court's con-
clusion that the Act provides statutory authority for a court to compel third
parties to assist in the implementation of an order, guided only by judicial
discretion in weighing the respective interests and burdens of the parties,
82
disregards the fact that the Act's applicability is limited to orders in aid of
the court's jurisdiction. 83  While the Company's refusal to help the FBI
clearly hinders the government's investigation, it does not in any way im-
pinge on the district court's authority.8 4 Since the Act does not provide the
federal courts with an independent grant of jurisdiction 85 and the majority
failed to specify the source of the district court's jurisdiction over the Com-
pany, it is submitted that the invocation of the All Writs Act to justify com-
pelling the Company to aid the government 86 was inappropriate.
The New York Telephone Court has not answered the attendant ques-
tion of the extent to which a court may use the All Writs Act to compel a
third party's assistance in a criminal investigation. 8 7  While recognizing an
obligation of the public to aid in the detection of crime and the enforcement
77. For the text of rule 41, see note 37 supra.
78. See note 52 and accompanying text supra. The majority stated: -[T]he definition of
property set forth in Rule 41(h) is introduced by the phrase, [t]he term 'property' is used in
this rule to include' [emphasis added], which indicates that it was not intended to be exhaus-
tive."' 434 U.S. at 170 n.18.
79. See FED. R. CuM. P. 41(h). See notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra.
80. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
81. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
82. 434 U.S. at 174-78. See notes 54-62 and accompanying text supra.
83. 434 U.S. at 188-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). See notes 43-44 & 72-75 and accom-
panying text supra.
84. 434 U.S. at 189-90 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). As justice Stevens stated:
[U]nless the Court is of the opinion that the District Court's interest in its jurisdiction
was coextensive with the Government's interest in a successful investigation, there is
simply no basis for concluding that the inability of the Government to achieve the pur-
poses for which it obtained the pen register order in any way detracted from or
threatened the District Court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
85. See note 72 supra. See also notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 61 supra.
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of the law,8 8 the majority has failed to adequately consider the serious in-
trusions of privacy which result from compelling a reluctant third party to
participate in law enforcement activities.8 9 Although the Court relied heav-
ily on the status of the Company as a highly regulated public utility in its
analysis of the propriety of the third party order, 90 it did not expressly limit
its holding to the particular factual situation presented and did not provide
the federal courts with clear standards to apply in future cases. 9 1 Con-
sequently, serious questions remain as to the appropriate analysis to be
employed in cases where the third party is a private citizen.
It is submitted that Congress is best equipped to make the policy de-
termination of whether a court should be empowered to direct a third party
to assist in the enforcement of criminal laws. 92 It is hoped that Congress
will act to remedy the Court's expansive construction of the All Writs Act by
enacting specific legislation that outlines the extent to which third parties
may be compelled to assist in criminal investigations. It is further hoped that
Congress will determine that the All Writs Act should not be invoked to
permit the issuance of an ancillary order to one who is not a party to the
original order. 93  Absent such congressional action, the Court's decision in
New York Telephone may facilitate significant impositions on third parties by
forcing them to assist federal officers as a result of a broad construction of
the statute. 94
88. 434 U.S. at 175-76 n.24. The Court indicated that citizens have an obligation to relate
any knowledge that they have of the commission of a crime. Id. Moreover, the Court suggested
that a district court's power to issue subpoenas to nonparty witnesses is evidence of the fact that
citizens have a duty to aid in the enforcement of the law. Id.
89. One commentator has suggested that the primary policy reason for not compelling assis-
tance in the installation of a pen register is the dangerous precedent that would be set "for
pressing unwilling citizens into a government service in the future." 1977 DUKE L.J. 751, 772.
In New York Telephone, the Court may have established a precedent whereby a district court
may now order a private citizen to open his home to government agents so that they may more
effectively investigate the neighbor next door. But see note 61 supra.
90. See notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text supra. See also Michigan Bell Tel. Co. v.
United States, 565 F.2d 385, 386 (6th Cir. 1977) (telephone company is not an ordinary third
party since it is a public utility enjoying a monopoly in an essential area of communications and
may be compelled to assist the government).
91. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
92. See Note, supra note 89, at 771 (as a matter of justiciability, the Court may determine
that the issue of the propriety of an order compelling the assistance of a third party in a criminal
investigation is a political question best left to Congress). But see Application of the United
States in the Matter of an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register or Similar Mechanical
Device, 538 F.2d at 965 (Mansfield, J., dissenting) (courts are better equipped than Congress to
determine the conditions under which assistance should be compelled). Cf. id. at 962 (the
potential dangers of such an order militate against compelling a third party's assistance). See also
Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register Device,
407 F. Supp. 398, 405 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (express statutory language, not ambiguous legislative
history, should guide judicial interpretation).
93. See notes 57-59 and accompanying text supra.
94. For a discussion of alternative theories for compelling a telephone company's assistance
in installing a pen register, see Comment, supra note 41 at 657-58.
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Since the pen register was recognized by the New York Telephone Court
as an effective investigative tool, 9 5 the imposition of strict safeguards on their
use has become imperative. Congress should not eschew this opportunity to
promulgate comprehensive guidelines for the use of pen registers analogous
to those provided in Title III for other forms of electronic surveillance. 96
Nina M. Gussack
95. 434 U.S. at 168, 178.
96. See notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
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